The Situation in Czechoslovakia and U.S. Forces in Europe by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
9-13-1968
The Situation in Czechoslovakia and U.S. Forces in
Europe
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "The Situation in Czechoslovakia and U.S. Forces in Europe" (1968). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 734.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/734
Congressional Record pp. 810716-17 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA.) 
THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSWV.AKIA 
AND 
U. S. FORCES IN EUROPE 
Mr . President: 
September 13, 1968 
MAIN FILE COPY 
DO NOT REMOY~ 
Many words have been spoken in the Senate about the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia . Many others will be spoken. This action 
was an outrageous affront to the people of that nation and a grave blow 
to international stability. 
Over half a million troops are reported on the move in Central 
Europe. Great numbers are involved in occupying a small country against 
its will . They cast a long shadow over the prospects for a peaceful 
Europe . They dim the hopes of people everywhere for a more peaceful 
world. 
In these remarks, I will not dwell on the various adverse 
implications of the recent developments in Czechoslovakia . In due 
course a report on that subject will be forthcoming in consequence of a 
brief visit which I made to Eastern Europe during the recent adjournment 
of the Senate . In these remarks , today, I will touch on only one aspect 
of the subject--the question of American force reductions in Western 
Europe, in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia crisis . 
Immediately after the Soviet invasion, I stated that there would 
be no point in continuing to advocate an immediate reduction in the level 
of these forces . I made that statement with resignation and sadness . 
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A reduction would have saved American taxpayers hundreds of millions of 
dollars, over the next few years. It would have had a significant correc-
tive effect on this nation's distorted balance of international payments. 
It would have helped to restore relationships with the countries of Western 
Europe to a normal basis; the continued presence of hundreds of thousands 
of American troops, along with a great number of dependents' homesteads on 
Western European soil is, per se, an abnormal relationship. 
I believe, moreover, that step-by-step reductions of our forces 
in Europe would have led the Western Europeans to assume a larger share of 
the burden of their own defense which, in turn, may well have resulted in 
closer cooperation among them. I believe, too, that it would have contributed 
to reducing the danger of catastrophic error which necessarily attends the 
presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign troops confronting hundreds of 
thousands of other foreign troops across a tense dividing line. Finally, 
reductions of our forces in Western Europe would have increased the pressures 
for and may well have brought about reductions of Soviet forces in the 
Eastern European countries, with or without negotiations to that end. 
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has had the effect of 
deferring these results. How long they will remain deferred depends, in 
great part, on the disposition which the Soviet government and its Warsaw 
Pact allies, Romania excepted, may make of the occupation forces now in 
Czechoslovakia. 
We can hardly make substantial reductions in u. S. forces in 
Western Europe while the Soviets have vastly increased their forces in 
Eastern European countries and have done so, furthermore, in connection 
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with the military steamrollering of the independence of a small country. 
To be sure, reductions in our forces even now, would not lessen, in any 
way, our responsibility under the North Atlantic Treaty to join in the 
common defense against an attack on Western Europe and the regions covered by 
the North Atlantic Treaty. Those responsibilities would be met in the event 
of an attack, not only because they are treaty obligations, but because they 
are inescapable responsibilities in terms of our own survival. They would 
be met whether the U. s. forces which were encamped in Western Europe at the 
time of an attack numbered one division or ten divisions. 
Nevertheless, a reduction in the U. s. contingents in Europe in 
present circumstances could be subject to misinterpretation in both West 
and East, and might conceivably lead to serious miscalculations. That is 
a risk which, it seems to me, we would be unwarranted in taking at this time, 
in our interests and in the interests of peace. It was that risk which led 
me to suggest a temporary deferment of the question. 
However, my views on the anachronistic size of the deployment of 
American forces and dependents in Europe have not changed. Certainly, I 
do not believe that the number of these Americans should be increased at 
this time, as some have suggested. Moreover, in my judfgllent, it remains 
desirable to undertake a gradual reduction in U. S. forces if and when the 
situation in Eastern Europe offers reasonable assurance that developments 
there are not going to spill over into Western Europe. If and when that 
time comes, I believe a positive plan should be ready to cut American forces 
in Europe. It should be a plan, phased over several years--perhaps on what 
might be termed a D plus D basis, that is, the withdrawal of one division 
of men with their dependents each year. That reduction, in my judfgllent, 
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should continue until the force levels remaining would be sufficient only 
to insure that military aggression from any source would enable the United 
States promptly to set in motion its immense powers for the common defense 
of the nations of the North Atlantic Pact. In the light of modern military 
technology, the five or six American divisions which are now stationed in 
Europe are hardly required for that purpose. In due course, it seems to me 
that the number could be reduced to one or at most two. 
I would like to make it plain that I believe that there has been 
a dereliction in the failure to have set in motion, heretofore, positive plans 
to bring about orderly, phased reductions in the European deployment. Indeed, 
some of us have been urging these reductions for more than a decade. The 
reiterated response, however, has been that "the time is not right." The 
time will never be right unless there is the will to face up to this situa-
tion. 
Even now, the time is right for a search for substantial savings 
in the cost of the European deployment. Events in Eastern Europe, notwith-
standing, possibilities of economy may well exist in streamlining the super-
structures at the various U. S. headquarters in Europe. It is appropriate 
to ask, for example, whether they are not top-heavy with high-ranking officers, 
staffs, and prerogatives, at the European Command at Stuttgart, the U. S. Air 
Force Headquarters in Europe at Wiesbaden, the European Communications Head-
quarters at Zweibrucken, or the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U. s. 
Naval Forces in London. Substantial cuts, long overdue, have already been 
made in u. S. civil establishments abroad on orders of retrenchment from 
President Johnson. It would be eminently desirable if the same orders might 
now be applied forthwith to the military entrenchments in Western Europe. 
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Had there been a timely reduction of forces in Western Europe, 
it would have already saved large sums of public money and contributed 
greatly to the strengthening of our international financial situation. 
May I say that I do not see how timely reductions in our forces 
would have impaired the defense of Western Europe. Nor do I see--had they 
been made some time ago, as urged time and again--how they would have had 
any effect on the present situation in Czechoslovakia. Certainly, the 
presence of these forces, in full NATO complement, as they are now, has 
added nothing to our ability to respond to events in that nation. Indeed, 
we would do well to ask ourselves if, on August 21, we had had three times 
the number of men we now have in Western Europe or, for that matter, if 
we had had only one-third the number, what difference it would have made 
in our reactions to the developments in Czechoslovakia. 
The fact is that NATO was formed to defend Western Europe and 
associated nations in the North Atlantic Treaty against attack. It was 
not designed to defend a Warsaw Pact nation against an attack from within 
that group. Though we may deplore the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the 
tragic event has not fallen--as it has developed to date--within the area 
of our shared military responsibility under NATO. Much less does it come 
within an area of unilateral U. s. responsibility. 
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On the subject of responsibility, I should like to emphasize, 
in closing, the importance which many Americans attach to Western Europe's 
responsibility to increase its own defense efforts--relative to our own--
in NATO. It is not helpful to the common undertaking when Western European 
defense budgets drop to levels disproport ionate to our own, when the number 
of men in the uniforms of Allied nations declines, when the periods of con-
scription are shortened or abolished, and other evidence presents itself 
of a reluctance on the part of Europeans to make sacrifices for their own 
defense. It makes Senators who ask their constituents to pay higher taxes 
to cover increased defense costs and who vote the conscription of young 
Americans for terms of obligated service which are equaled in length among 
the NATO members only i n Greece, Turkey, and Portugal--it makes us question 
policies that require these sacrifices of our people when others seem unwill-
ing to make equivalent sacrifices for themselves . 
I reiterate , therefore, that while events in Czechoslovakia may 
counsel a temporary wait-and-see with respect to the present level of the 
American NATO contingent and dependents in Europe, these events do not 
cancel the validity of the concept of phased reductions. The fact is that 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia has not changed, in any way, two basic 
elements in the proposal for such reductions which the Senate has had 
under consideration for some time. 
1. This nation has budgetary and balance of payments 
difficulties at a time when the Western European nations are more able 
than ever before to meet added costs of defense . Indeed, the West Germans 
have a balance of payments surplus of several billion dollars a year, a 
level so high that some West Germans describe it as "embarrassing." 
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2. Our forces are in Europe for the defense of the NATO 
countries against the threat of military attack from the East. Yet, 
despite Czechoslovakia, there is little indication that the other NATO 
nations regard this threat as drastic enough to stimulate any significant 
increase in financial and other sacrifices for their own defense. Events 
in Eastern Europe notwithstanding, if the NATO countries are unwilling to 
make these sacrifices and our present financial plight is prolonged, 
pressures for a reduction of American forces in Europe may be expected 
to resume promptly--and properly so. 




PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS. SECOND SESSION 
Vol. 114 WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1~, 1968 No. 149 
House of Representatives 
The House was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Monday, September 16, 1968, at 11:00 a.m. 
The Senate met at 11 a.m., and was 
called to order by Hon. PAUL J. FANNIN, a 
Senator from the State of Arizona. 
The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown 
Harris, D.D., offered the following 
prayer: 
Eternal God, Father of our spirits, with 
a faith that will not shrink though 
pressed by every foe, we would this day 
climb the altar steps which lead through 
darkness up to Thee, for our greatest 
need is of Thee. 
In the crises of our times join us with 
those who, across the waste and wilder-
ness of human hate and need, preparing 
the way of the Lord, throw up a high-
way for our God. 
God the AU-righteous, man hath defied 
Thee. Yet to eternity standeth Thy word; 
falsehood and wrong shall not tarry be-
side Thee. Give to us peace in our time, 
0 Lord, that the sundered family of man-
kind at last may be bound by golden 
cords of understanding fellowship around 
the feet of the one God. 
In the dear Redeemer';; name. Amen. 
DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESI-
DENT PRO TEMPORE 
The assistant legislative clerk read the 
following letter: 
U .S. SENATE, 
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, 
Washington, D.C., September 13, 1968. 
To the Senate: 
Being temporarily absent from the Sen-
ate, I appoint Hon. PAUL J. FANNIN, a Sena-
tor from the State of Arizona, to perform 
the duties of the Chair during my absence. 
CARL HAYDEN, 
President pro tempcn:e. 
Mr. FANNIN thereupOn took the chair 
as Acting President pro tempore. 
THE JOURNAL 
Senate 
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1968 
of the Journal of the proceedings of 
Thursday, September 12, 1968, be dis-
pensed with. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pOre. Without objection, it is so ordered. 
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE 
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its 
reading clerks, announced that the 
House had agreed to the report of the 
committee of confe~nce on the disagree-
Ing votes of the two Houses on the 
amendments of the House to the bill CS. 
2515) to authorize the establishment of 
the Redwood National Park in the State 
of California, and for other purposes. 
LIMITATION ON -STATEMENTS DUR-
ING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE 
MORNING BUSINESS 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that statements in 
relation to the transaction of routine 
morning business be limited to 3 min-
utes. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it Is so ordered. 
~ECUTIVE SESSION 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in 
view of the fact that in the Chamber at 
this time is the distinguished majority 
leader of the House, the Honorable CARL 
ALBERT, and inasmuch as his presence 
fits in with the business of the Senate, I 
ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
go into executive session to consider the 
nominations on the Executive Calendar. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I The assistant legisllvtive clerk read the 
ask unanimous consent that the reading nomination of William J. Holloway, Jr., 
of Oklahoma, to be U.S. circuit judge, 
lOth circuit. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, the nomination 
is considered and confirmed. 
The assistant legislative clerk read the 
nomination of Lawrence Gubow, of 
Michigan, to be U.S. district judge for 
the eastern district of Michigan. 
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, it is a 
pleasure to indicate my support for the 
nomination of Mr. Lawrence Gubow of 
Detroit, Mich., to be U.S. district judge 
for the eastern district of Michigan. 
Mr.- Gubow has had a distinguished 
career as an attorney. Educated at the 
University of Michigan and its law 
school, he was admitted to the Michigan 
bar in 1951. Subsequently, he served as 
an attorney with the Detroit law firm of 
Rosin & Kobel. 
In 1953, Mr. Gubow joined the Michi-
gan Coporation and Securities Commis-
sion and was chosen its commissioner in 
1956. He served as commissioner until 
1961, when he was appointed U.S. at-
torney for the eastern district of Michi-
gan, the postion he now holds. 
Mr. Gubow serves as president of the 
Jewish Community Council of Metro-
politan Detroit, and he is a leader in the 
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. and 
various Michigan veterans groups. 
I know Mr. Gubow as an able and 
highly qualified member of the bar and 
as a widely respected public servant. He 
has bipartisan support for his nomina-
tion, and I am confident that he will 
make an outstanding judge. 
Mr. President, I am pleased to recom-
mend that the Senate advise and consent 
to the nomination of Lawrence Gubow. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, the nomination 
is confirmed. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the President 
be immediately notified of the confirma-
tion of these nominations. 
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The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. With out objection, it is so ordered. 
LEGISLATIVE SESSI ON 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
move that the Senate resume the con-
sideration of legislative business. 
The motion was agreed to; and the 
Senate resumed the consideration of 
legislative business. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that I may proceed 
for an additional 5 minutes at this time. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. without objection, it is so ordered. 
THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLO-
VAKIA AND U.S. FORCES IN 
EUROPE 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, many 
words have been spoken in the Senate 
about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia. Many others will be spoken. This 
action was on outrageous affront to the 
people of that nation and a grave blow 
to international stability. 
Over half a million troops are reported 
on the move in Central Europe. Great 
numbers are involved in occupying a 
small country against its will. They cast 
a long shadow over the prospects for a 
peaceful Europe. They dim the hopes of 
people everywhere for a more peaceful 
world. 
In these remarks, I will not dwell on 
the various adverse implications of the 
recent developments in Czechoslovakia. 
In due course, a report on that subject 
will be forthcoming in consequence of 
a brief visit I made to Eastern Eu~·ope 
during the recent adjournment of the 
Senate. In these remarks, today, I will 
touch on only one aspect of the subject-
the question of American force reduc-
tions in Western Europe, in the after-
math of the Czechoslovakia crisis. 
Immediately after the Soviet invasion, 
I stated that there would be no point 
in continuing to advocate an immediate 
reduction in the level of these forces. I 
made that statement with resignation 
and sadness. 
A reduction would have saved Ameri-
can taxpayers hundreds of millions of 
dollars, over the next few years. It would 
have had a significant corrective effect 
on this Nllltion's distorted balance of in-
ternational payments. It would have 
helped to restore relationships with the 
countries of Western Europe to a normal 
basis; the continued presence of hun-
dreds of thousands of American troops, 
along with a great number of depend-
ents' homesteads on Western European 
soil, is, per se, an abnormal relationship. 
I believe, moreover, that step-by-step 
reduotions of our forces in Europe would 
have led the Western Europeans to as-
sume a larger share of the burden of 
their own defense which, in turn, may 
well have resulted in closer cooperation 
among them. I believe, too, that it would 
have contributed to reducing the danger 
of catastrophic error which necessarily 
attends the presence of hundreds of 
thousands of foreign troops confronting 
hundreds of thousands of other foreign 
troops across a tense dividing line. Fi-
nally , reductions of our forces in West-
em Europe would have increased the 
pressures for and may well have brought 
about reductions of Soviet forces in the 
Eastern European countries, with or 
withoUJt negotiations to that end. 
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
has had the effect of deferring these re-
sults. How long they will remain deferred 
depends, in great part, on the disposition 
which the Soviet Government and its 
Warsaw Pact allies, Romania excepted, 
may make of the occupation forces now 
in Czechoslovakia. 
We can hardly make substantial re-
ductions in U.S. forces in Western Eu-
rope while the Soviets have vastly in-
creased their forces in Eastern European 
countries and have done so, furthermore, 
in connection with the military steam-
rollering of the independence of a small 
country. To be sure, reductions in our 
forces, even now, would not lessen, in any 
way, our responsibility under the North 
Atlantic Treaty to join in the common 
defense against an attack on Western 
Europe and the regions covered by the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Those responsi-
bilities would be met in the event of an 
attack, not only because they are treaty 
obligations, but also because they are 
inescapable responsibilities in terms of 
our own survival. They would be met 
whether the U.S. forces which were en-
camped in Western Europe at the time 
of an attack numbered one division or 
10 divisions. 
Nevertheless, a reduction in the U.S. 
contingents in Europe in present circum-
stances could be subject to misinterpre-
tation in both West and East, and might 
conceivably lead to serious miscalcula-
tions. That is a ris{ which, it seems to 
me, we would be unwarranted in taking 
at this time, in our interests and in the 
interests of peace. It was that risk which 
led me to suggest a temporary deferment 
of the question. 
However, my views on the anachro-
nistic size of the deployment of Ameri-
can forces and dependents in Europe 
have not changed. Certainly, I do not 
believe that the number of these Amer-
icans should be increased at this time, 
as some have suggested. Moreover, in my 
judgment, it remains desirable to un-
dertake a gradual reduction in U.S. 
forces if and when the situation in East-
ern Europe offers reasonable assurance 
that developments there are not going 
to spill over into Western Europe. If and 
when that time comes, I believe a posi-
tive plan should be ready to cut Amer-
ican forces in Europe. It should be a 
plan, phased over several years-perhaps 
on what might be termed a D plus D 
basis-that is, the withdrawal of one di-
vision of men with their dependents each 
year. That reduction, in my judgment, 
should continue until the force levels 
remaining would be sufficient only to in-
sure that military aggression from any 
source would enable the United States 
promptly to set in motion its immense 
powers for the common defense of the 
nations of the North Atlantic Pact. In 
the light of modem military technology, 
the five or six U.S. divisions which are 
now stationed in Europe are hardly re-
/ 
quired for that purpose. I n due course, 
it seems to me that the number could 
be reduced to one or at most two. 
I would like to make it plain that I 
believe that there has been a dereliction 
in the failure to have set in motion, here-
tofore, positive plans to bring about or-
derly, phased reductions in the European 
deployment. Indeed, some of us have 
been urging these reductions for more 
than a decade. The reiterated response, 
however, has been that "the time is not 
right." The time will never be right un-
less there is the will to face up to this 
situation. 
Even now, the time is right for a search 
for substantial savings in the cost of the 
European deployment. Events in Eastern 
Europe notwithstanding, possibilities of 
economy may well exist in streamlining 
the superstructures at the various U.S. 
headquarters in Europe. It is appropriate 
to ask, for example, whether they are not 
topheavy with high-ranking officers, 
staffs, and prerogatives, at the European 
Command at Stuttgart, the U.S. Air Force 
headquarters in Europe at Wiesbaden, 
the European communications head-
quarters at zweibrucken, or the head-
quarters of the commander in chief, U.S. 
Naval Forces in London. Substantial cuts, 
long overdue, have already been made in 
U.S. civil establishments abroad on 
orders of retrenchment from President 
Johnson. It would be eminently desirable 
if the same orders might now be applied 
forthwith to the military entrenchments 
in Western Europe, 
Had there been a timely redu-::tion of 
forces in Western Europe, it would have 
already saved large sums of public money 
and contributed greatly to the strength-
ening of our international financial situ-
ation. 
May I say that I do not see how timely 
reductions in our forces would have im-
paired the defense of Western Europe. 
Nor do I see-had they been made some 
time ago, as urged time and again-how 
they would have 'had any effect on the 
present situation in Czechoslovakia. Cer-
tainly, the presence of these forces, in 
full NATO complement, as they are now, 
has added nothing to our ability to re-
spond to events in that nation. Indeed, we 
would do well to ask ourselves if, on Au-
gust 21, we had had three times the num-
ber of men we now have in Western Eu-
rope or, for that matter, if we had had 
only one-third the number, what differ-
ence it would have made in our reac-
tions to the developments in Czecho-
slovakia. 
The fact is that NATO was formed to 
defend Western Europe and associated 
nations in the North Atlantic Treaty 
against attack. It was not designed to 
defend a Warsaw Pact nation against an 
attack from within that group. Though 
we may deplore the occupation of Czech-
oslovakia, the tragic event has not fall-
en.:_as it has developed to date-within 
the area of our shared military respon-
sibility under NATO. Much less does it 
come within an area of unilateral U.S. 
responsibility. 
On the subjed of responsibility, I 
should like to emphasize, in closing, the 
importance which many Americans at-
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tach to Western Europe's responsibility 
to increase its own defense efforts--re-
lative to our own-in NATO. It is not 
helpful to the common undertaking when 
Western European defense budgets drop 
to levels disproportionate to our own, 
when the number of men in the uniforms 
of Allied nations decline, when the 
periods of conscription are shortened or 
abolished, and other evidence presents 
itself of a reluctance on the part of 
Europeans to make sacrifices for their 
own defense. It makes Senators who ask 
their constituents to pay higher taxes to 
cover increased defense costs and who 
vote the conscription of young Americans 
for terms of obligated service which are 
equaleC. in length among the NATO mem-
bers only in Greece, Turkey, and Portu-
gal-it makes us question policies that 
require these sacrifices of our people 
when others seem unwilling to make 
equivalent sacrifices for themselves. 
I reiterate, therefore, that while events 
in Czechoslovakia may counsel a tem-
porary wait-and-see with respect to the 
present level of the American NATO con-
tingent and dependents in Europe, these 
events do not cancel the validity of the 
concept of phased reductions. The fact 
is that the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
has not changed, in any way, two basic 
elements in the proposal for such reduc-
tions which the Senate has had under 
consideration for some time. 
First. This Nation has budgetary and 
balance-of-payments difficulties at a 
time when the Western European na-
tions are more able than ever before to 
meet added costs of defense. Indeed, the 
West Germans have a balance-of-pay-
ments surplus of several billion dollars a 
year, a level so high that some West Ger-
mans describe it as "embarrassing." 
Second. Our forces are in Europe for 
the defense of the NATO countries 
against the threat of military attack 
from the East. Yet, despite Czechoslo-
vakia, there is little indication that the 
other NATO nations regard this threat 
as drastic enough to stimulate any signif-
icant increase in financial and other 
sacrifices for their own defense. Events 
in Eastern Europe notwithstanding, if 
the NATO countries are unwilling to 
make the sacrifices and our present fi-
nancial plight is prolonged, pressures for 
a reduction of American forces in Europe 
may be expected to resume promptly-
and properly so. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I 
congratulate the able majority leader, 
and agree without reservation to his 
statement this morning. 
Recently a representative of the Ger-
man Government called on us. The able 
majority leader has expressed my senti-
ments so well I shall send a copy of his 
address to that fine gentleman. 
I hope our Stat.e Department realizes 
that there is a large and growing feeling 
in the Senate that concurs with these re-
marks just made; and hope also that 
our allies in Europe realize the respect 
we have and the American people have, 
for this Member of this body who knows 
so much about our foreign policy and 
who has just returned from Europe. 
As one who was in the executive branch 
at the time of the creation of NATO 
and the formation of SHAPE, I watch 
with apprehension the lack of responsi-
bility, apparently, of countries which 
now have a crisis in their own backyards. 
I hope they take to heart the wise obser-
vations of our majority leader this morn-
ing. This should be a joint defense in 
Europe, and one set up on a realistic 
basis; else it can only fail. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
wish to express my thanks to the senior 
Senator from Missouri who has been a 
leader in the fight, for more years than 
I care to remember, in trying to bring 
about a readjustment of policy vis-a-vis 
our relations with our European allies. 
The Senator has been an inspiration to 
us all in this matter. 
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the distin-
guished majority leader is always wise 
in his thoughts and I am always anxious 
to hear what he has to say. I look for-
ward to reading his speech in the RECORD. 
COMMITTEE MEETING DURING 
SENATE SESSION 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Committee 
on the Judiciary be authorized to meet 
during the session of the Senate today. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. 
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF 
SENATOR DODD 
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that at the close of 
the morning business and when the Sen-
ate takes up the pending business I be 
recognized for such .time as may be 
required. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving 
the right to object, and I shall not object, 
I wish to call the attention of the ma-
jority leader to this matter. We have be-
fore us a request for priority of recogni-
tion for as much time as the Senator 
requires. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator 
from Connecticut ask to be recognized 
in the morning hour? 
Mr. JAVITS. After the morning hour. 
The request blocks everybody from 
speaking, and the Senator could take 3 
days. 
Mr. DODD. I shall not be that long. 
Mr. JA VITS. Will the Senator put a 
limit on the request? 
Mr. DODD. I have no intention of pre-
venting anyone from speaking. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the distin-
guished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. 
DODD] be recognized immediately after 
the conclusion of routine morning busi-
ness and after the pending business is 
laid before the Senate. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, It is so ordered. 
Mr. JA VITS. I have a 15-minute speech 
in connection with the Fortas nolnina-
tion. The Senator is acquainted with my 
problem. The Senator will accommodate 
me, will he not? 
Mr. DODD. I shall. My interest is in 
expediting the pending business. I did 
not put a time limitation on my request 
for the pw·pose of prolonging anything. 
INCOME TAX REFORM ESSENTIAL 
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, 
we Americans bear an extremely heavy 
income tax burden. our Internal Reve-
nue laws are unfair. There must be in-
come tax reform. Laws should be simpli-
fied, tax loopholes closed, and special 
privileges to the ultrarich denied. 
Last year, 37 Americans with incomes 
of more than a half Inillion dollars paid 
no income taxes whatever on their stu-
pendous incomes. They owned many 
Inillions of dollars worth of tax- free 
bonds and took advantage of every tax 
loophole available. In 1967 20 persons 
whose incomes exceeded $1 million each 
for that year paid no income taxes 
whatever for the previous year, nor for 
1967. These superrich taxpayers claim 
charitable exemptions. Some create so-
called charitable foundations. Unfortu-
nately, we ordinary taxpayers must pay 
more as these ultrarich do not pay their 
fair share. 
During recent years, extremely 
wealthy men and women purchase and 
operate "Gettysburg farms" and then 
claim tax losses from farlning. This can 
be a device to cut down taxes on non-
farm income. Of course, the land values 
of their farms increase tremendously 
year after year, but our State and Fed-
eral Governments receive very little In-
creased taxes for that. 
Middle-class wage earners and many 
business and professional men bear the 
burden of almost intolerable taxes while 
those of great wealth buy tax-free bonds, 
or large farms which are really show-
places in many instances, or take ad-
vantage of various available tax loop-
holes. 
Another tax loophole is the 27%-per-
cent depletion allowance for oil and gas 
producing companies and the 23-percent 
depletion allowance for some 41 other 
minerals produced. The oil depletion al-
lowance, in particular, has always ap-
peared indefensible since the time in 
1949 when I served on the Ways and 
Means Committee. I have, since that pe-
riod, consistently voted to reduce it or 
abolish the allowance altogether. In 
1967, five of the largest oil and gas pro-
ducing corporations in the United States 
with net profits approximating $6 bil-
lion paid only 9 percent in taxes to our 
good Uncle Sam. This, due to the deple-
tion allowance. This, at a time when in-
dividual Americans with modest earn-
ings are shelling out at least one-fourth 
of their incomes in taxes, or having 
wages deducted to that extent. 
Mr. President, it should be a most im-
portant duty of the 91st Congress con-
vening next January to provide real and 
needed tax reform. 
FORTAS-THORNBERRY AND THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, although 
the Constitution provides that Supreme 
Court Justices are to be appointed "with 
the advice and consent of the Senate," 
strangly enough, it seems to be the 
opinion of many that the "advice and 
consent of the American Bar Associa-
tion"-not the Senate-is all that should 
be required. 
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Apparently, we have arrived at a point 
where even some leaders of tile bar refuse 
to recognize the Senate constitutional 
responsibility in the appointing process. 
During the recent ABA convention in 
Philadelphia, Joseph A. Ball, president of 
the American College of Trial Lawyers, 
was quoted as follows: 
Let's repudiate those lunatics (in the 
Senate who questioned Justice Fortas) ... 
they are not fit to tie Justice Fortas' shoes. 
(Syracuse (N.Y.) Herald-American, August 
11,1968). 
Over and over again, a refrain is heard 
that the Senate should routinely con-
firm the pending Supreme Court nomina-
tions because, after all, the ABA has de-
termined that the nominees are "quali-
fied." 
In view of all this, I believe it is neces-
sary and appropriate for the Senate to 
take a close look at the role of the ABA 
and the procedures it has followed in 
passing judgment on the pending 
nominations. 
Frankly, as one member of the ABA, 
I was shocked to learn-and I believe 
many of my 133,000 fellow members will 
be shocked to learn-about the way ABA 
approval came about in the case of 
the Fortas-Thornberry nominations. 
First. It should be understood, first of 
all, that these nominations have never 
been approved by the ABA membership 
or by its governing body, the house of 
delegates. The only approval has come• 
from the ABA's Committee on the Fed-
eral Judiciary. 
Second. Most of the members of the 
12-man ABA Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary had no knowledge whatsoever 
of the Fortas-Thornberry nominations 
until about 7 a.m. on the morning of 
June 26, the very day the President pub-
licly announced his appointments. 
Third. On that morning, the commit-
tee "met"-if that is the proper term-
by means of a telephone conference call 
which lasted the better part of 1 hour. 
During' this conference call the commit-
tee members were informed of the Presi-
dent's intention, and they were advised 
of investigative reports on the nominees. 
Fourth. The investigation of Mr. 
Thornberry was conducted by Leon 
Jaworski, of Houston, Tex., a close as-
sociate for many years of President John-
son. Mr. Jaworski, although not a mem-
ber of the committee, participated in 
the conference call meeting. 
Fifth. Since that time, Mr. Jaworski 
has been quoted as saying he was asked 
to investigate Judge Thornberry "be-
cause I knew him better than the others." 
Sixth. Although it has been reported 
that committee approval was unanimous 
I am advised that at least one membe1: 
of the committee had no knowledge 
whatsoever of the conference call and 
took no part in any vote on the nominees. 
In view of such circumstances, I won-
der what weight the members of the U.S. 
Senate are expected to assign to the oft-
cited approval by the American Bar As-
sociation of the Foiias-Thornberry 
nominations. 
After all, we are not picking an all-
America backfield or deciding whether 
Mickey Mantle should be on the all-star 
team. As U.S. Senators, we are called 
upon to exercise a constitutional respon-
sibility which affects the whole fabric of 
American society for generations to 
come. 
What weight should be given to the 
recommendations of Mr. Jaworski? Ac-
cording to the New York Times of August 
3, 1968, Mr. Jaworski is "a former attor-
ney for President Johnson, who has been 
associated with Mr. Johnson .for years."' 
Could he reasonably have been expected 
to report unfavorably on a Presidential 
selection under such circumstances? 
Why was the ABA committee given so 
little time in which to consider such im-
portant nominations? As I understand 
it, the committee generally takes much 
more time-often a week-to consider 
nominations to lower court positions. 
Of course, it is not the function of 
Congress to effect reforms in the proce-
dures of a private professional organiza-
tion. But the Senate should take note of 
such procedures as well as the fact that 
widespread misunderstanding seems to 
have grown up concerning the role of 
the ABA in such matters. 
In fairness, I should emphasize that 
the ABA committee on the Federal ju-
diciary has acknowledged limitations on 
its role. For example, letters from the 
chairman of the committee, Albert E. 
Jenner, to Senator EASTLAND-see pages 
1, 69 of the hearings on nominations of 
Fortas and Thornberry-transmitting 
the committee's recommendation with 
respect to Messrs. Fortas and Thorn-
berry contain this statement: 
Our responsibility is to express our opinion 
01f1Y on the question of professional qualifi-
cations which includes. of course, considera-
tion of age and health, and of such matters 
as temperament, integrity, trial and other 
experience, education and demonstrated legal 
abiUty. It is our practice to express no opin-
ion at any time with regard to any other 
consideration not related to such professional 
qualifications which may properly be consid-
ered by the appointing or confirming au-
thority. 
Clearly, in its own letters, the ABA 
committee recognizes that the confirm-
ing authority-the Senate-may prop-
erly take into account other considera-
tions not related to professional quali-
fications. 
Under the circumstances, it is difficult 
to understand why some ABA leaders 
ciiticize the Senate when it sees fit to 
exercise its constitutional respOnsibility 
by looking at matters outside the mere 
professional qualifications of a nominee. 
Of course, even in the limited area to 
which ABA approval is applicable, there 
is no obligation on the part of the Sen-
ate to substitute ABA judgment for its 
own. Indeed, for the Senate to follow 
such a course would be an abdication of 
its constitutional responsibility. 
And, of course, it is nonsensical to 
suggest--as some have suggested-that 
ABA approval of a nominee should some-
how preclude all further Senate inquiry, 
even as to matters admittedly not cov-
ered by the ABA. 
' For example, in 1960 a suit was brought 
in Texas challenging the right of Mr. Johnson 
to run for Vice President and Senator at the 
same time. Lawyers defending Mr. Johnson's 
position included Jaworski and Fortas. 
In order to determine the weight to be 
accorded the ABA approval in the For-
tas-Thornberry case, the Senate should 
know what matters were, in fact, consid-
ered by the ABA's committee during its 
hour-long telephone meeting. Is a tran-
script of that discussion available to the 
Senate? To what extent, if at all, did the 
committee concern itself with Mr. For-
tas' role as an advisor to the President 
while sitting as a Justice of the Supreme 
Court? Were the opinions of Judge 
Thornberry, including the decision in 
University Committee against Lester 
Gunn, carefully reviewed by the com-
mittee during that hour? 
As a member of the ABA, I have been 
interested to find that a significant num-
ber of other members share my concern 
about the inadequacy of present ABA 
procedures-paliicularly in light of the 
role in judicial selection claimed for the 
ABA by some of its leaders. 
During the course of this controversy, 
some members have been surprised to 
learn that the ABA does not pass on 
whether a nominee is among the best 
qualified for a judicial post, but merely 
determines whether the nominee meets 
a minimum standard of professional · 
qlilllification. 
Some do not believe it is Iight for a 
12-member committee to purpoii to 
speak on such matters for the 133,000 
members of the American Bar Associa-
tion. 
Dming the recent convention in Phila-
delphia, two resolutions calling for re-
forms in this area were submitted to the 
ABA assembly. Although action has not 
been taken, the mere introduction of 
such resolutions was read by many as a 
significant sign. 
Fmihermore, I am aware that several 
members of the ABA's Committee on the 
Federal Judiciary were very much dis-
turbed because they were expected on 
the morning of June 26 to give such 
hasty rubber-stamp approval to the 
Fortas-Thornberry nominations. Be-
cause the time allowed for such consid-
eration was so short and because the 
political character of these and other 
Supreme Court nominations has been so 
apparent, I understand that members of 
this ABA committee came close at Phila-
delphia to recommending that the ABA 
abandon altogether its role with respect 
to appointments to the Supreme Court. 
Mr. President, while I am critical of 
certain procedures which have been fol-
lowed by one ABA committee in this par-
ticular situation, my remarks today 
should not be interpreted as blanket 
criticism of the ABA or of all its officers. 
Indeed, I am proud of my membership 
in this great association which has gen-
erally advanced the legitimate interests 
of the legal profession in n:any com-
mendable ways. 
Neveiiheless, on this occasion, I am 
convinced that there is need to reestab-
lish and maintain a proper perspective 
concerning the appropiiate roles of the 
U.S. Senate and the ABA in the appoint-
ing process. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous COl'!.-
sent that an aiiicle from the New York 
Times of August 3, 1968, an a1iicle from 
the Los Angeles Times of August 3, 1968, 
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